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Abstract
On March 24th 2004, the European Commission issued its long awaited Microsoft
decision, which has now been published on its Website.1 On April 29th 2004, the
Court of Justice handed down its judgment in the IMS Health case.2 Both deci-
sions have important implications for all companies with valuable IP portfolios
that do business in the European Union. Although these decisions are arguably
not revolutionary given the existing legal framework for dominant companies set
out in Article 82 EC, they illustrate that EC competition law sometimes strikes a
different balance than US antitrust law between spurring innovation by protecting
IP rights and promoting competition in innovation-driven markets.
WASHINGTON     s    NEW YORK   s    BALTIMORE     s   NORTHERN VIRGINIA     s   LONDON     s    BRUSSELS     s     BERLIN
1             http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf
2  Case C-418/01 IMS Health v. NDC Health, nyr.
3  Previously, it had bundled the Windows OS with the media player developed by complainant Real Networks.
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On March 24th 2004, the European Com-mission issued its long awaited Microsoft decision, which has now been published on 
its Website.1  On April 29th 2004, the Court of Justice 
handed down its judgment in the IMS Health case.2 Both 
decisions have important implications for all companies 
with valuable IP portfolios that do business in the Eu-
ropean Union. Although these decisions are arguably 
not revolutionary given the existing legal framework 
for dominant companies set out in Article 82 EC, they 
illustrate that EC competition law sometimes strikes a 
different balance than US antitrust law between spur-
ring innovation by protecting IP rights and promoting 
competition in innovation-driven markets. 
In this bulletin, we examine (i) the Commission’s 
treatment of tying issues with respect to Microsoft’s 
Windows Media Player; (ii) the Commission’s analysis 
of Microsoft’s withholding of interoperability speciﬁca-
tions for workgroup server operating systems; and (iii) 
the Court of Justice’s pronouncements on refusals by 
dominant companies to license IP rights in IMS Health. 
In each case, we outline the principal arguments, place 
them in the existing framework of Article 82 EC, com-
pare them to US antitrust law, and comment on their 
possible implications for future cases. 
I. Microsoft’s tying of the Windows operating 
system with the Windows Media Player
1.  The Commission’s decision
Since 1999, Microsoft has licensed its succes-
sive versions of Windows operating systems (OS) 
only in a bundle with its own Windows Media 
Player (“WMP”).3 The Commission found this to 
constitute illegal tying under Article 82 (d) EC. In 
the Commission’s view, this practice amounts to an 
abuse of Microsoft’s dominant position in the PC 
OS market.  The Commission ordered Microsoft to 
unbundle the two products by making available to PC 
OEM manufacturers a version of its OS that does not 
include WMP code.  
Having – unsurprisingly – concluded that Micro-
soft holds a dominant position in the PC OS market, 
the Commission ﬁrst found that “streaming” media 
players constitute a market separate from PC OS. To 
support this ﬁnding, the Commission relied, among 
other things, on evidence of demand for streaming 
media players separate from OS’s (mostly through 
free Internet downloads), as well as the existence 
of specialized media player vendors such as Real 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING LLP  WWW.WILMER.COM 2
4  Case T-30/89 Hilti v. Commission [1991] ECR II-1439.
5  Case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak v. Commission [1996] ECR I-5951 (“Tetra Pak II”).
6  Case T-203/01 Michelin v. Commission, nyr (para. 241); Case T-219/99 British Airways v. Commission, nyr. (para. 293).
7  See, e.g., Tetra Pak II supra note 5. 
  
Networks (RealPlayer) and Apple (QuickTime). The 
Commission rejected Microsoft’s argument that there 
is no consumer demand for OS without a media player. 
It found that, absent Microsoft’s bundling, PC OEMs 
could meet consumer demand for a pre-installed media 
player by supplying the OS with a media player other 
than WMP. 
Next, the Commission found that Microsoft’s 
refusal to license to OEMs its Windows OS without 
WMP constituted tying within the meaning of Article 
82(d) EC. In particular, the Commission observed that 
although OEMs were free to install additional media 
player software, they were unable technically to un-
install WMP. It also rejected Microsoft’s argument 
that the WMP is included in Windows without “extra 
charge”, because (i) a charge for WMP might be “hid-
den” in the Windows/WMP bundled price; and (ii) the 
pricing issue was in any event irrelevant to the foreclo-
sure concerns that drive the rules against tying. 
The Commission then undertook an extensive analy-
sis of the foreclosure effects of tying WMP to Windows. It 
found that given the ubiquity of Microsoft’s OS, suppliers 
of other media players cannot gain comparable access 
to customers’ PCs.  Although the Commission examined 
other distribution channels (e.g., Internet downloading 
and OEM installation agreements), it concluded that none 
could match the penetration of Windows OS. 
The Commission also found the ubiquity of WMP 
to create incentives for content providers and software 
developers to encode their products using only WMP 
technology. According to the Commission, the rapid 
growth of WMP to the detriment of competing media 
players (measured, e.g., on the basis of player usage, 
format usage, content offered by websites, installed 
base) shows the exclusionary effects of Microsoft’s 
practice. (Elsewhere in the decision, the Commission 
also notes the potential “chilling effect” of WMP-style 
bundling on software developers seeking to develop 
additional functionalities whose markets would be pre-
empted if Microsoft decided to integrate comparable 
functions into Windows.)  
Finally, the Commission considered, but ultimately 
rejected, several “objective justiﬁcations” that Mi-
crosoft proffered. As to distribution efﬁciencies, the 
Commission noted that the same efﬁciencies could be 
obtained if Microsoft offered OEMs the choice whether 
to include WMP or another media player with PCs they 
ship. As to possible efﬁciencies resulting from content 
and applications developers being able to place calls to 
WMP’s application programming interfaces (“API”), 
the Commission also found that such efﬁciencies could 
also be realized without tying, i.e., by OEMs deciding 
on their own to pre-install WMP if the latter offers the 
best functionality.  
2. Comparison with EC precedent   
Given existing Article 82 EC precedent, such as 
Hilti4 and Tetra Pak II,5 it is arguably not surprising 
that the Commission concluded that tying Windows 
with WMP constitutes an abuse. Indeed, in analyzing in 
detail the actual foreclosure effects of Microsoft’s tying 
practices, the Commission seems to have taken a less 
strict view of Article 82’s tying prohibitions than the 
Community courts in recent decisions.  For example, 
in Michelin II and British Airways, the Court of First 
Instance determined that for less exclusionary forms 
of bundling (pricing incentives), the Commission need 
not show that bundling actually led to foreclosure so 
long as the conduct in question is likely to have such 
an effect.6 The Commission’s dismissal of the objective 
justiﬁcations offered by Microsoft seems consistent 
with the Community courts’ strict scrutiny of such 
justiﬁcations in previous tying cases.7  
3. Comparison with US antitrust law 
Some US commentators have criticized the 
Commission’s Microsoft decision – including its ty-
ing analysis and the remedies imposed – as hostile to 
innovation and out of step with US antitrust law. On 
closer inspection, however, the decision does not seem 
to diverge signiﬁcantly from US tying law. 
http://law.bepress.com/wilmer/art17
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4. Implications for future cases 
In terms of precedent setting, the primary 
signiﬁcance of the Commission’s decision (if upheld 
by the Community Courts) is its implications for 
Microsoft’s future plans to include additional sets of 
functionalities into its next OS release (code-named 
“Longhorn”), for example virus protection and search 
engine functionalities. While the Commission’s 
decision sets out the analytical framework under 
Article 82 EC if Microsoft decides to incorporate 
such functionalities into Longhorn, it is not 
necessarily dispositive for the outcome of any such 
future investigation. The Commission’s analysis of 
foreclosure effects and possible efﬁciencies of tying 
WMP is highly fact speciﬁc. It is therefore conceivable 
that the analysis could be different depending on the 
functionality in question and on developments in the 
dynamically evolving software industry over time. 
For instance, as broadband Internet access proliferates 
and users’ sophistication in downloading software 
increases, the foreclosure effects of tying additional 
functionalities to Microsoft’s OS may no longer be 
viewed as signiﬁcant. If Microsoft can show that 
efﬁciencies from integration outweigh relatively 
limited foreclosure effects, it might be able to avoid 
liability under Article 82 EC. 
The possible implications of the Commission’s 
decision outside of Microsoft’s OS are more 
speculative. Few markets -- in or outside the software 
industry -- exhibit the degree of market power and 
network effects that Microsoft enjoys in PC OS. In 
terms of network effects, platform software for mobile 
devices may have comparable potential, but as yet 
no dominant provider of such platform software has 
emerged.  
More generally, though ultimately of no avail to 
Microsoft, the Commission’s willingness to at least 
consider arguments about the absence of foreclosure 
and redeeming virtues of prima facie abusive practices 
may  foreshadow  a somewhat  more economically
rigorous  approach  to Article  82 EC enforcement 
by the  Commission. The Commission’s forthcoming
notice   on  the  subject   will  shed  more  light  on  its 
intentions. 
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING LLP   
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8              http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f4400/4469.htm
9              http://ecfp.cadc.uscourts.gov/MS-Docs/1720/0.pdf
10             http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f200400/200457.htm
As regards Microsoft’s tying, the US Department 
of Justice (DOJ) and many States brought their own 
antitrust action against Microsoft in 1998, alleging 
among other things that Microsoft illegally bundled 
Windows OS with its Internet Explorer web browser. 
That case focused on an allegation under Section 
2 of the Sherman Act that Microsoft had sought to 
eliminate the Netscape Navigator browser to protect 
its quasi monopoly in the PC OS market. However, 
the Government also relied on a tying theory under 
Section 1.  Although the district court ruled for the 
plaintiffs on the tying claim,8 the court of appeals 
reversed on the ground that the district court wrongly 
applied the per-se rule to tying practices involving 
the complex markets for platform and applications 
software.9 
The court of appeals explicitly left open the pos-
sibility that the plaintiffs could succeed under a rule of 
reason analysis on remand.  Since the plaintiffs later 
abandoned their tying claim, it is not clear how the US 
courts would have applied the rule of reason.  
Further, the “WMP code removal” remedy that 
the Commission imposed arguably does not go much 
further than the unbundling remedy in the settlement 
between Microsoft and the Government that the 
district court approved in November 2002.10  Under 
the settlement, Microsoft must provide means for 
enabling OEMs and end-users to hide the icon and 
entries representing the WMP application on the 
computer screen, but Microsoft is not required to 
remove code. 
As a formal matter, that the US settlement did 
not require code removal can be explained by the 
fact that the settlement remedies were not designed to 
remedy tying as such.  As a matter of substance, the 
Commission’s insistence on unbundling through code 
removal is based on its ﬁnding that parallel installation 
of two players would impose substantial support costs 
on OEMs, so that they would rarely if ever choose 
to install non-Microsoft media players in addition to 
WMP.  Whether or not the Commission is right as a 
factual matter, the EC remedy does not represent a 
fundamental difference in approach to that of the US 
agencies or courts. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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II.  Microsoft’s withholding of interoperability 
speciﬁcations for workgroup sever operating 
systems
1. The Commission’s decision
The Commission also determined that Microsoft 
had infringed Article 82 EC by abusing its dominance 
in the desktop and workgroup server OS markets in 
order to achieve and maintain dominance in the latter 
market.  The Commission found that Microsoft had 
refused to supply Sun Microsystems and other rivals 
with the speciﬁcations for protocols that Windows work 
group servers use. By refusing to do so, Microsoft kept 
those companies from implementing such speciﬁcations 
to develop fully interoperable work group sever OS 
products. As a remedy, the Commission ordered 
Microsoft to provide all interested parties with the 
necessary interoperability speciﬁcations within 120 
days on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.
The Commission found Microsoft dominant not 
only in the market for PC OS, but also in the market for 
work group server OS delivering ﬁle, print and group 
and user administration services in small to medium-
sized networks. Microsoft vigorously argued that there 
is not a separate market for such a narrow category 
of server OS. (Microsoft has a much weaker market 
position for other types of server OS, in particular for 
high-end servers.) The company argued that the same 
OS could be used for all types of servers regardless 
of what tasks the servers performed, and that OS for 
higher-end types of servers could easily be “slimmed 
down” to be sold as work group server OS. 
The Commission responded that Microsoft itself 
offers a differentiated range of server OS for different 
tasks at signiﬁcantly different prices. Moreover, it 
found that due to their frequent interaction with client 
PCs, work group server OS require a higher degree of 
interoperability than OS for other types of servers and 
are thus not substitutable by other types of servers. This 
also led the Commission to conclude that competitors 
could not easily “scale down” OS originally designed 
for higher-end servers since those usually do not offer 
the same degree of interoperability with client PCs as 
work group servers do.   
In the market for work group server OS, the 
Commission estimated that Microsoft’s market share 
exceeds 60 %. In addition, it emphasized the close 
links with the market for PC operating systems due to 
interoperability requirements.  Referring in particular to 
the Tetra Pak II judgment, it inferred from those links 
that Microsoft should be considered dominant in both 
markets. Nevertheless, it appears that the Commission 
links Microsoft’s abusive behavior primarily to its 
dominance in the market for PC OS. 
The Commission found that Microsoft had abused 
its dominant position by refusing to supply speciﬁcations 
for both client-to-server and server-to-server protocols 
that would enable competing server OS software to fully 
interoperate with the Windows domain architecture. It 
reached this conclusion despite its explicit recognition 
that disclosure of the relevant protocols could impinge 
on Microsoft’s intellectual property rights. Although 
recognizing that refusals to license intellectual property 
can constitute an abuse only in exceptional circumstances, 
the Commission refused to be bound by an “exhaustive 
checklist” of such circumstances as set out in Magill11 or 
other judgments by the Community courts.   
Here, the Commission found the following facts 
to constitute exceptional circumstances justifying the 
ﬁnding of an abuse. First, Microsoft’s refusal to disclose 
protocol speciﬁcations amounted to a disruption of 
“previous levels of supply”. In particular, the Commission 
found that Microsoft made such disclosures before 
it had a credible server OS offering, but deliberately 
discontinued them after it developed one in order to 
disadvantage its rivals. Second, Microsoft’s refusal 
to disclose protocol speciﬁcations risked eliminating 
competition in the work group server OS market, as 
demonstrated by Microsoft’s “rapid rise to dominance” 
in that market. Third, the Commission emphasized that 
interoperability disclosures were indispensable for rivals 
to compete, and that open industry standards supported 
in Windows, the distribution of client-side software 
by the server OS vendor, or reverse engineering of 
Microsoft’s products provided no viable substitute. 
Fourth, the Commission found that Microsoft’s conduct 
was not justiﬁed by the protection of its intellectual 
property rights. Any disincentives for future innovation 
by Microsoft resulting from the compulsory disclosure 
of such IP rights would be outweighed by the substantial 
promotion of competitive innovation in the market as a 
whole.  The Commission repeatedly pointed out that it 
was not requiring Microsoft to disclose the actual source 
code of its OS, but only the speciﬁcations necessary to 
ensure interoperability.
11           Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE and ITP v. Commission, [1995] ECR I-743 ("Magill")
http://law.bepress.com/wilmer/art17
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2. Comparison with EC precedent 
In condemning Microsoft’s refusals to deal with 
its competitors, the Commission relies on a series of 
judgments concerning this category of abuse, namely 
Commercial Solvents,12 Magill,13 Tiercé Ladbroke,14 and 
Bronner15. Given the Commission’s acknowledgement 
that the disclosures refused by Microsoft would likely 
impinge on Microsoft’s IP rights, Magill is arguably 
the precedent that is most on point.  However, the facts 
in Magill were quite different from those here because 
the refusal concerned an input (a single channel’s 
copyrighted TV listings) that was needed to market a 
completely new product (a multi-channel TV guide). 
Here, by contrast, complainant Sun Microsystems was 
seeking the disclosure of interoperability information 
to compete more effectively with an existing product 
against Microsoft’s existing products.  
The Commission’s express refusal to be bound by 
an “exhaustive checklist of exceptional circumstances” 
justifying compulsory licensing shows that it recognizes 
its decision is breaking new ground. On the other 
hand, that Microsoft appears to have made sufﬁcient 
interoperability information available to server OS 
vendors until it had a credible product offering of its 
own is a factor that was not present in Magill – there 
the copyright holder had never before licensed its TV 
listings. Indeed, the termination of existing supplies to 
a competitor when those supplies are essential for the 
competitor’s business has been condemned as abusive 
by the Community Courts since  Commercial Solvents 
in 1974. The signiﬁcance of Microsoft’s previous 
dealings with Sun and other workgroup server OS 
vendors are therefore likely to be a key legal issue in 
Microsoft’s appeal to the Court of First Instance. 
3. Comparison with US antitrust law 
Some US commentators have also criticized  
the Commission’s assessment of Microsoft’s refusal to 
make interoperability disclosures. Again, one can 
distinguish between the substantive assessment of 
refusals to deal and the remedies already in place with 
respect to the US settlement. 
Previous US legal proceedings against Microsoft 
did not center on refusals to deal. Unlike the 
Commission, the US did not allege that Microsoft 
had monopolized or attempted to monopolize the 
server software market. The disclosure requirements 
that formed part of Microsoft’s settlement and are 
discussed below were designed to remedy Microsoft’s 
unlawfully maintained desktop OS monopoly by 
facilitating rivals’ development of “middleware” 
products that could lower the “applications barrier to 
entry” and help erode the desktop monopoly. 
Would a US court have found monopolization on 
the basis of the Commission’s factual record? As the US 
Supreme Court has recently conﬁrmed in the Trinko16 
case, US antitrust law recognizes few exceptions to the 
general principle that even monopolists are free to deal 
with whomever they please.  In particular, the Supreme 
Court was unwilling to expand its previous holding in 
Aspen Skiing.17 In Aspen, a ski operator controlling 
three of the four mountain areas within the area had 
terminated a joint selling arrangement with the much 
smaller operator. It even refused to sell its tickets at 
retail prices, preventing the smaller operator from 
offering an all-area ski ticket. If one interprets Trinko as 
limiting actionable refusals to deal to situations where 
the monopolist has previously dealt with rivals on 
commercial terms, it seems doubtful that a US agency 
or court would have found Microsoft’s refusal to deal 
to constitute a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act. Notwithstanding the previous disclosures of 
interoperability information by Microsoft to server 
OS vendors, it did not “sell” those disclosures on a 
commercial basis, and certainly not to end customers. 
As regards existing US remedies, Microsoft argued 
before the Commission that its “Communications 
12  Joined Cases 6 and 7-73, Commercial Solvents and Others v Commission, [1974] ECR 223.
13            See, e.g., Magill supra note 11.
14  Case T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke v Commission, [1997] ECR II-923.
15  Case C-7/97, Bronner, [1998] ECR I-7791.
16            Verizon v. Trinko, 540 U.S. ____ (2004). 
17            Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands, 472 U.S. 585.
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Protocol Program” (MCPP), which it developed 
in connection with  its settlement with the US 
Department of Justice, was an sufﬁcient remedy 
for any interoperability concerns. The Commission 
disagreed. It pointed out that this program only 
addresses client-to-server and not server-to-server 
protocols, and was thus insufﬁcient given the 
tight link between client-to-server and server-to-
server interoperability. It appears that Microsoft 
has recently expanded the scope of the MCPP in 
response to concerns voiced by DOJ, and that Sun 
as the principal complainant before the Commission 
has decided to participate in MCPP as part of its 
more comprehensive US$ 1.6 billion settlement with 
Microsoft. It is thus unclear whether there is still a 
signiﬁcant gap between MCPP and the requirements 
imposed by the Commission in its decision. 
4. Implications for future cases 
The implications of the Commission’s 
pronouncements on interoperability requirements 
are likely to be broader than those of its ﬁndings 
on WMP bundling. The Commission’s decision 
potentially means that any dominant supplier of 
hardware or software is required to continue to 
supply interface information to rivals offering 
peripherals or accessories in competition with the 
dominant supplier if the dominant supplier has 
previously decided to provide such information.  In 
contrast, it could be argued that suppliers who have 
never made interface information protected by IP 
rights available to rivals might only be subject to 
compulsory licensing under Article 82 EC under the 
narrower circumstances of Magill, i.e., where they 
are suppressing the emergence of a new product not 
yet offered by the dominant supplier. 
III.  IMS Health
When the Court of Justice handed down its 
IMS Health judgment, both Microsoft and the 
Commission immediately claimed that it supported 
their respective legal positions.  As explained 
below, the better view seems to be that IMS Health 
is not dispositive for the outcome of Microsoft’s 
appeal. Nonetheless, IMS Health is a signiﬁcant 
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step to clarifying the reach of the Magill doctrine on 
compulsory licensing generally.
1. The Court’s judgment and EC precedent   
The Court of Justice’s ruling in the IMS Health case 
is the culmination of an ongoing saga. IMS provides 
pharmaceutical companies with data on the sale of 
pharmaceutical products, which is used for, among 
other things, remunerating sales representatives. To 
provide useful data to its customers within existing 
privacy constraints, IMS had developed and copyrighted 
a geographical breakdown called a “brick structure” 
for processing data received from pharmaceutical 
wholesalers. When IMS rival NDC tried to use a similar 
brick structure in order to provide pharmaceutical data 
collection services in competition with IMS, the latter 
brought a successful action in German courts to block 
the use of its copyrighted system. NDC complained to 
the Commission, which adopted an interim decision 
requiring IMS to license its brick structure to NDC. After 
IMS successfully sought a suspension of the decision 
from the President of the CFI (an order conﬁrmed by the 
President of ECJ), the Commission eventually withdrew 
the interim decision in August 2003 on the basis that the 
Camera Care criteria were no longer satisﬁed as NDC 
no longer needed protection.  In parallel, the German 
trial court hearing the copyright dispute referred to the 
Court of Justice the question of whether IMS’ refusal to 
license its brick structure to NDC constituted an abuse 
of a dominant position under Art. 82 EC.  
In its ruling, the Court provided some important 
clariﬁcations about the exceptional conditions under 
which Article 82 EC justiﬁes compulsory licensing. 
First, drawing on its Bronner judgment, the Court 
clariﬁed that it is not an essential element of the 
Magill doctrine that the “input” that is deemed to be 
essential to competing in the downstream market is 
sold separately.  Rather, it is sufﬁcient if the input is 
part of a “potential” or even a “hypothetical” market. 
For IMS, this means that it cannot defend itself solely 
on the basis that it has never commercially offered 
licenses to its brick structure. 
Second, the Court stated that compulsory licensing 
can be required only where the company requesting  
http://law.bepress.com/wilmer/art17
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the license “does not intend to limit itself essentially to 
duplicating the goods or services already offered” by 
the dominant IP right holder, but  “intends to produce 
new goods or services not offered by the owner of 
the right and for which there is a potential consumer 
demand.”  There are clearly a number of ambiguities in 
the Court’s language.  In particular, there is an obvious 
gray zone between products that are not “essentially a 
duplication of existing products” and products that are 
truly “new”.  Given that the Court deals with a scenario 
in which the “new” and existing products by deﬁnition 
belong to the same (dominated) antitrust market, 
signiﬁcant improvements to existing products could 
arguably sufﬁce to be considered “new products”. 
Moreover, the Court’s notion of an “intent” to offer new 
products begs the question of how serious such intent 
must be to gain access to the dominant company’s 
essential inputs.  It remains for future cases to resolve 
these questions, so it is premature to say whether IMS 
Health should be read as a limitation or expansion of 
Magill, in terms of requirements on the product to be 
offered by the complainant. 
Third, the Court agreed the complainants in the 
IMS Health case that the extent to which customers had 
participated in the elaboration of IMS’s brick structure 
and the costs that they may incur in switching to an 
alternative structure are relevant for the analysis under 
Article 82,  insofar as they affect the complainant’s 
ability to offer a viable product in competition with 
IMS.  If such switching costs are fatal to a viable 
competitive offering, this would imply that access to 
IMS’s brick structure is in fact “indispensable” and 
could thus give rise to compulsory licensing if the 
other elements of the Magill test are met. 
2. Comparison with US antitrust law 
As pointed out above, US antitrust law is very 
skeptical about refusal to deal claims. The Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of its Aspen Skiing decision in the 
Trinko case suggest that when the dominant company 
has not previously supplied the complainant or other 
companies with the essential input on commercial 
terms, it will be difﬁcult to establish the conditions 
necessary to make a refusal to deal actionable.  To the 
extent that the IMS Health judgment makes it clear 
that previous commercial dealings are not an essential 
requirement of Article 82 liability based on refusal 
to deal, it thus would thus appear to widen the gap 
between EC and US antitrust law.
3. Implications for future cases 
In terms of its implications for the Microsoft 
appeal, the IMS Health judgment is arguably not 
dispositive.  As mentioned above, the Commission has 
not directly relied on the test set out in Magill, and its 
case is thus not directly affected by any modiﬁcation 
or clariﬁcation of Magill in IMS Health.  Nor would 
IMS Health appear to affect the Commission’s 
premise that there is no “exhaustive check list” of 
“exceptional circumstances” justifying compulsory 
licensing.  Therefore, both parties could only seek to 
take comfort from certain parts of the judgment.  
For instance, the Commission is likely to welcome 
the Court’s clariﬁcation that there need not be an 
existing market for the relevant “input”, because this 
should help address arguments such as that disclosure 
of interoperability information is not customary in the 
software industry. Conversely, Microsoft may seek to 
argue that competing server OS are not “new” products 
within the meaning of IMS Health, but merely seek 
to replicate functionality (including client-to-server 
and server-to-server interoperability) that Microsoft’s 
workgroup server operating systems already offer.  At 
the end of the day, it seems more likely that the Court 
of First Instance will decide on the Microsoft case by 
examining the speciﬁc arguments in the Commission’s 
decision rather than by simply invoking IMS Health 
in order to rule one way or the other.  
IMS Health may however have signiﬁcant general 
implications for dominant IP right holders.  The 
Court’s statement that even a “hypothetical” market for 
essential input is sufﬁcient in a compulsory licensing 
context could have far-reaching consequences for 
arguably dominant companies holding process 
and component patents, copyrights, or other forms 
of secret know-how that provide a signiﬁcant 
competitive advantage.  Also, as mentioned above, the 
ambiguity of the Court’s “new product” and “intent” 
requirements may tempt some national authorities and 
courts towards a broad interpretation of compulsory 
licensing requirements, in particular where Article 
82 EC is invoked as a defense in patent infringement 
cases. Last, the Court’s acknowledgement that 
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customer involvement in developing products can 
heighten the risk of compulsory licensing may in 
certain cases discourage such customer involvement 
with a negative impact on innovation. 
IV. Conclusion 
The Commission’s Microsoft decision and the 
Court’s IMS Health judgment do not mark a signiﬁcant 
change in the interpretation and enforcement of Article 
82 EC. However, precisely for that reason, they do 
illustrate the differences in approach – sometimes 
subtle, sometimes obvious – between the European 
Union and the United States to balancing the interests 
of IP right holders with that of stimulating competition 
where a proprietary technology has become the de-
facto industry standard.  Even after the two decisions, 
many issues still await clariﬁcation through further 
case law, which now will be shaped by agencies and 
courts throughout the EU’s 25 jurisdictions.  IP right 
holders doing business in Europe are well advised to 
follow these developments closely.
*  *  *
This bulletin has been prepared by Sven Völcker, 
Lee Greenﬁeld, Chuck Stark, Antonio Capobianco 
and Markus Hutschneider.  
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